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 This report is based on a Genome BC, Genome Canada, SFU, and UBC funded 
study from 2009-2011 of the competitiveness of the BC wine industry as compared to 
other wine industries around the world (other cases and comparative analysis will be 
released as a book or special edition sometime in 2011-12).  Though the BC industry has 
had remarkable success, we focus on vulnerabilities (possible weaknesses) for growth 
and stability in the industry (as listed in the Table of Contents).  We use cluster theory, 
which suggests that firms competing in the same industry also have reason to cooperate.  
When we compare BC with the other cases studied, namely, Italy, Spain, Australia, and 
Chile, we find that there is far less cooperation, institutional support and leadership, and a 
heavy dependence on the local market, particularly local tourism.  There are weaknesses 
as well in access to knowledge and learning through limited opportunities for 
interactions, agricultural extension, and training.  This may be natural given the early 
stage of BC‟s wine industry, however, it also suggests adjustment is important for long-
term growth and evolution.  One of the key differences is that BC does not compete for 
exports, which in the other cases pushes the firms towards a shared long-term vision 
(such as Australia‟s 2025 vision statement).  The perception by many in industry is that 
BC produces at too low a volume and too high a price to compete for exports.  However, 
the examples of all the other cases show that even small producers can export given 
adequate institutional support, and, above all, in producing a high quality consistent 
product that is well marketed.  This reinforces in turn the need for closer attention to 
improving the quality of grapes in BC, which equally requires a long-term strategy along 
the same lines and long-term relationships with wineries that currently are haphazard.  
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Thus, we envision a BC wine industry that could take the next step forward into 
becoming a producer of global quality and renown, if certain steps are taken.  On the 
other hand, resistance to this research and to change is also predominant in the industry; 
with the recent growth and advantages to incumbents, there is limited appeal for change 
at the moment. 
 
The analysis is based on original data gathered by Andy Hira via 53 interviews and 
surveys with winemakers and suppliers in the Okanagan during summer 2010 as well as 
background analysis of historical, political, economic and social factors.  These were 
supplemented by the creation of a database on wineries in the region, as well as input 
from experts on the industry.  We hope the report will spark debate and interest in further 
serious research into how to improve the long-term competitiveness of BC wine.  We 
invite comments. 
Introduction 
 The analysis in this report is structured around a theoretical framework I have 
developed for the larger comparative project- that industry competitiveness depends on 
policies that guide: markets, institutions, networks, and supply chains.  We apply the 
framework to the British Columbia (BC) Canada wine industry, with an emphasis on the 
area with the greatest concentration, the Okanagan Valley (OKV).  Our approach focuses 
on the potential role of public and collective support institutions to promote industry 
competitiveness in clusters.  By clusters, we mean geographically concentrated producers 
in the same industry.  I take an evolutionary view of the role of such institutions, 
reflecting my recent work that a successful public-private partnership requires continual 
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adaptation to changes in markets (Hira, forthcoming).  I therefore completely reject the 
false dichotomy that prevails that either markets (private companies) or states 
(governments) determine economic success.  Productive public-private interactions are 
fundamental to successful industries.  The analysis in this report strongly reinforces this 
point- to be successful BC needed and will need public-private partnerships that are 
responsive, flexible, and pro-active. 
The Recent Creation of the OKV Wine Industry- Market 
Trends and Policy Responses 
 
 Lake Okanagan and the presence of a suitable range of mesoclimates make the 
Okanagan Valley (OKV) an attractive location for viticulture.  The OKV stretches far, 
about 155 km from Lake Country in the North to Osoyoos in the South, on the border 
with the US, for about a 2 hour drive, and about 9-16 km in width.  In addition, a grape 
growing region in the South from East to West, from Osoyoos to Princeton, principally 
the Similkameen Valley, spans some 100 additional km.  Over 90% of BC‟s tree fruit 
acreage and 95% of its grapes are grown in the OKV.  The Cowichan Valley on 
Vancouver Island and the Fraser Valley, just east of Vancouver, the other main areas for 
wine production have about 50 hectacres of vines as opposed to over 9,000 in the OKV   
The BC Wine Institute 2009 BC Crop Survey indicates that 96.35% of all BC wine is 
produced in the OKV. 





Notes: map created by author using imaps BC (Provincial government web-based tool), 




Grape and wine industry in British Columbia (BC) and, more particularly, the 
Okanagan Valley (OKV) can be traced back to 1859 (BC Wine Institute), though there 
are some who suggest that such a claim stretch the truth.  The OKV was dominated early 
on by apple production, from the time the first commercial orchard was opened in 
Penticton in 1890.  Tree fruit orchards were considered much more viable than grapes 
given the harsh Okanagan winters (Nichol 1983, 128 & 136).   
Early wine was reportedly made from loganberries grown at Saanich on 
Vancouver Island and in the Fraser Valley.  Early varieties of grapes in BC, as in the rest 
of Canada were native (primarily Labrusca), rather than European ones, because of a 
perceived need for frost-hardiness.  In the 1920s, J.W. Hughes, an immigrant from Iowa 
began growing commercial grapes, and started Pioneer Vineyard.  His fruit operations 
were to evolve into the giant Sun-Rype Products (Nichol 1983, 129).  The onset of the 
Depression led some apple growers to begin to make wine from it.  The first of these was 
the Domestic Wines and By-Product Company run by Pasquale Capozzi and W.A.C. 
Bennett (later Premier of BC), which set up in 1932.  By 1934, they realized that apple 
wines were not competitive with grape wines, and they began to import grapes from 
California.  The name changed to Calona in 1936 (Adams 1992, 9-10). 
Bill Collings notes a key event that changed the industry, “In the 1930‟s the 
Rittich brothers, both with degrees in viticulture and oenology from Hungary, established 
a vineyard in the Black Mountain area near Kelowna.  They published the results of their 
five-year viticultural experiment.  I believe the title was Growing European Grape 
Varieties in a Climate Where the Winters are Long and Cold.  To my knowledge, this 
was the first planting of many of the current vinifera varieties.  Eugene Rittich became 
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the winemaker for Grower‟s Wines.”  In 1932, Growers Wine Co. began to produce wine 
from grapes in the OKV under the name of Beau Sejour, which started in 1928 (Rowe 
1970, 22-23).  The taste of the early wine was considered poor, so that much of the early 
wine was fortified into port or sherry for drinkability.  After World War II, grapes were 
often imported from California for blending with the native Labrusca varieties.  Growers 
hired Frank Schmidt to plant a white seedless grape called Himrod that was marketed as 
Canadian Liebfraumilch until litigation from Germany forced them to change the name to 
Rhine Castle.  The adoption of European names was common by BC wineries then 
(Schreiner 2000, 8).  From the 1950s, hybrid grape varieties were planted in BC, leading 
to a general mix of 80% hybrid, 20% Labrusca.  In 1952, there were a total of 425 acres 
devoted to grapes, of which 383 were devoted to American hybrid varieties.  By 1960, 
the total was just 572 acres (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 44-45).   
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, Andrés Wines (Port Moody, 1961), Casabello 
Wines (Penticton, 1966) Mission Hill (Kelowna, 1966), and Uncle Ben‟s Industries 
(Westbank) were also established.  In 1966, Growers wine was bought by Castle Wines, a 
subsidiary of Imperial Tobacco, who produced wines under the name Ste. Michelle 
(Adams 1992, 11).  The general orientation of both the BC and Ontario vineyards was 
towards mass production of low cost, high alcohol content wines to serve local markets, 
called “jug” or “plonk” wine.  The Prairies was one important market for both.  In both 
places, a highly regulated oligopoly of a few large firms characterized industry structure 
(Hickton and Padmore 2005, 86-7 and Senate Standing Committee 1978, 16-17).   
Early regulatory emphasis was on developing the grape industry.  Given his roots 
in the industry, it is not surprising that W.A.C. Bennett, then premier of the province, 
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pushed for local sourcing of grapes, a seeming quid pro quo for the government‟s role in 
distributing wineries‟ products (Ross 1995, 33).  As a result, the British Columbia Liquor 
Control and Licensing Board (BCLCB) sought to increase the local use of grapes in the 
wine industry, increasing the required quota from 25 to 50% in 1962, and up to 65% in 
1965.  The results were impressive, with grape acreage increasing by 400% in BC by 
1967, and the average local grape content of wine increasing to 81%, finally settling at 
80% in 1969 (known as the 80/20 rule).  The end result was greater vertical integration 
between wineries and local suppliers, moving towards long-term contracts.  At the same 
time, it increased pressure for improved quality of grapes, as wineries had to shift from 
their previous dependence on higher quality American grapes (Adams 1992 28; 
Kingsbury 2004, 3).   
In 1968, the Inkameep vineyard began planting Riesling and Ehrenfelser grapes 
imported from Europe; interestingly, the foundation of the vineyard was the product of a 
partnership between the department of Indian Affairs and national grape juice and wine 
distributor Andrés Wines. Throughout this period, the preponderant grape being planted 
in the OKV (Okanagan Valley of BC) remained the Labrusca variety
1
.  There was strong 
skepticism that vinifera grapes could succeed, with one early writer stating “the 
Okanagan climate (due to the harshness of winters) is marginal for the production of 
grapes suitable for quality wine…as yet the limited plantings (of quality grapes) provide 
scant evidence that it will be possible to consistently produce high sugar, low acid, 
quality grapes from such vines…(Miles 1981, 98, notes are mine).”  The orientation 
towards dessert type wines fit with the capabilities of the Labrusca and hybrid grapes, 
                                                 
1
 Originally a wild grape found in the eastern United States, it yields a black-blue grape popular in North 
American Wines. In the vernacular, it is referred to as a „skunk grape.‟ 
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orienting wineries and growers towards yield and hardiness from winter, rather than 
quality (Miles 1981, 4). 
Just 4 wineries dominated the scene in 1978: Calona (4.2 m gallons of storage 
capacity), owned by Standard Brands Ltd.; Jordan & St. Michelle (3.2), owned by 
Carling O‟Keefe Ltd.; Andrés (2.75); Casabello (1.5), owned by John Labatt Ltd.; with 
Uncle Ben‟s Country Winery producing just 0.45 of the total 12.1 million gallons 
produced (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 64-7).   
 BC grape supply was grown exclusively in the OKV, with a 1978 report 
estimating 43% of the total provincial acreage of 3,000 acres was in and around Oliver, 
Osoyoos, Cawston and Keremeos.  Only 2% of these grapes were European vinifera, with 
the rest being hybrid grapes (with the native Labrusca).  Regulatory protection that had 
existed de facto since World War II in the sense that few imported table wines were listed 
in BC liquor stores began to dissipate in 1974 as the listing of imported wines grew 
(Schreiner 2000, 8). Furthermore, a crisis of overproduction of grapes by the late 1970s 
led to more active provincial and industry efforts to improve grape varieties in order to 
expand a viable wine industry in line with changing tastes (Senate Standing Committee 
1978, xix).   At the same time, consumer attitudes towards wine were beginning to 
change, with a new generation demanding more but higher quality wine with less 
emphasis on alcohol content (Senate Standing Committee 1978, xxviii).  These wines 
were known as “mod” or “pop” wines in that they had low alcohol and carbonation 
(similar to what we call wine coolers now) (Miles 1981, 1).  This led to a rise in import 
shares from 15% in 1970 to 31% by 1977 (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 31), 
pushing the government and industry to adjust. 
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Early responses including packaging improvements, such as changing labeling 
and moving to European style bottling and corks (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 33).  
Such efforts coincided with the growth of capacity to produce quality wine based in good 
part on a limited series of agricultural projects from the late 1960s and 1970s, including 
the planting of Johannisberg Riesling by Jordan and Ste Michelle, the successor to 
Growers.  The industry in BC transitioned at this time towards the production of Baby 
Duck champagne, in response to changes in the local market towards less sweet and 
lower alcohol content wine, using hybrid grapes (Schreiner 2000, 8; Hickton 2005, 7). 
 The roots for long-term change lay in 1974 when the Canadian Federal 
government purchased 4000 vinifera vines
2
 and conducted an agro-experiment at 18 
different sites across BC (BC Wine Institute).  In 1975, George Heiss Sr., the owner of 
Gray Monk, began working with Helmut Becker, a legendary director of wine research in 
Germany‟s Geisenheim Institute to test the ability to adapt vinifera, including testing 
close to 50 varieties (Riesling, Gewurztraminer, Pinot Blanc), and a Rotberger (that led to 
a true Rosé) to the OKV.  According to some informants, this came on the heels of an 
earlier experiment with Inkameep.  The experiment lasted over 8 years in 2 spots (in 
north and south Okangan) and developed the varieties that “have become the industry‟s 
backbone” (Schreiner 2000, 9; Hickton 2005, 74).   
A 1978 study of the industry notes in regard to the $3 price ceiling BC wine could 
not surpass (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 37): 
The difficulties experienced by BC wineries in obtaining higher prices for their 
improved quality wines reflects the market situation ten years ago. At that time, 
B.C. wines were definitely inferior to available European wines….Present 
                                                 
2
 Vines from the European varieties that are considered more palatable than the native labrusca variety. 
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government liquor advertising laws currently inhibit the ability of the wineries to 
convince the consumer that their higher priced products are a reflection of higher 
quality. 
The lack of coordination between vineyards and growers led to overproduction of 
grapes and an inability to improve quality, such as reduced usage of European varieties 
and poor locations.  This led to some consternation about the role of the B.C. Grape 
Marketing Board.  The Marketing Board derived from the rapid increase in grape 
cultivation owing to the large increase in production from 1,100 tons in 1958 to 10,000 in 
1972, as tree fruit planters switched over, partly in response to growing demand by 
wineries.  The B.C. Grape Growers Association had interlinked members with the B.C. 
Tree Fruit Marketing Board, so that they knew from experience that such boards could 
regulate the industry.  Therefore they set up a marketing board with the permission of the 
government in 1970.  The Marketing Board created standard prices per ton by variety of 
grape each year.  However, in an odd twist, growers registered with the Board prior to 
1977 received Class A licenses for existing acreage, meaning wineries were obliged to 
buy their grapes first, even if they were of the Labrusca variety.  The Marketing Board 
created fierce resistance among wineries who lost their ability to individually negotiate 
with growers, and thus, they claimed, to establish long-term relationships aimed at 
improving quality.  Nor were attempts made to differentiate varieties for the meso-
climates throughout the OKV.  These problems reverberated with experiments in 1977 by 
local tree-fruit juicer Sun-Rype to develop grape juice production with federal 
government price support.  The $500,000 investment required a minimum of 900 tons of 
grapes to break even.  However, only 370 of the needed 1,000 tons of grapes were 
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delivered by growers, indicating a lack of coordination between growers, Sun-Rype and 
wineries (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 50-6 & 97).  These issues reflected an 
overall conclusion that grape and labour costs would price BC wines above imports 
without drastic change (Ross 1995, 32). 
The Senate report notes that BC wineries had traditionally marketed their own 
products.  Eighty five percent of wine was sold to the BC market, and 15% to other 
Canadian provinces, though there were dreams of exporting particularly to Asian markets 
such as Japan (73 & 93).  In 1976, import agents formed a 42 member lobbying 
association to deal with the provincially-run Liquor Distribution Board.  This led the 
wineries to utilize the B.C. Wine Council (est. 1974) to promote their product, begin to 
generate statistics about the industry, develop better relationships with the grapegrowers, 
and lobby the government.  Calona withdrew from the Council in 1976 (Senate Standing 
Committee 1978, 37 & 69). 
By 1980, the wine industry was in full crisis, with none of the wineries reporting a 
profit that year (Miles 1981, 2).  From 1970-80, imported wines sales increased over 
500%, and by 1988 imported wine sales accounted for 53% of all wine sales in BC.  At 
the same time, sales increases were preponderantly in white wines, leading to a surplus of 
red grapes (Adams, 20).  The B.C. wineries won the day, and key changes were made to 
market regulations that further spurred the industry, including (Senate Standing 
Committee 1978, 38-9): 
-reducing the mark-up on BC wines under 14% alcohol from 66 to 46% while 
lowering it on imported wines from 117% to 100% 
-banning new imports that retailed under $2.75 
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-creating minimal volumes and standard sizes in order to be permitted to sell 
-creating shelf space for local products; allowing more frequent ads; and 
permitting for the first time retail sales at the winery 
-preventing sales at grocery stores (which might lead to a downgrading of product 
or less shelf space for local producers who were smaller) 
The changes followed through from a 1978 Provincial law that allowed for the 
establishment of small-scale wineries.  Liquor board mark-ups for them were set at 15% 
for sales in Liquor Board stores and 0 for direct sales to customers and licensees.  The 
idea was to build estate wineries around the following guidelines, a precursor to the VQA 
system we discuss below, including (Miles 1981, 6-9): 
-a minimum of 20 acres and of annual production of 7,500 gallons 
-a maximum of 30,000 gallons 
-all wine was from 100% BC grapes, and at least 50% from the winery‟s 
vineyards 
-at least 2 wines will be stocked by government liquor stores 
-price should be above $3 per 750 ml. bottle 
The BC Estate Winery Association (BCEWA) was founded in 1984 as the 
Okanagan Valley Estate Wineries Association, but changed its name when a non-Valley 
winery joined.  The original membership was 5 wineries who cooperated to develop retail 
outlets (Kingsbury 2004, 39-40). 
In addition, the new regulations designated the category “farm gate winery” to 
denote those producing between 1,000-10,000 gallons or 500-5,000 cases per year.
3
  
Farm wineries were expected to grow 75% of their own grapes and use 100% BC grapes.  
                                                 
3
 According to the LDB, this category no longer exists. 
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As with estate wineries, farm wineries were allowed to create on-site shops.  As of 1998, 
there were 13 farm wineries in the OKV, and 18 throughout BC (Hackett 1998, 56). 
Both of these aspects were closely tied to an idea of an agri-tourism basis for the 
industry.  The already existing bounty of skiing, hiking, golf, and beaches provided the 
conditions to make the OKV a world class tourism spot.  The original idea, then, was that 
the wineries would combine forces with the fruit stands, including pick your own, 
country markets, etc., to provide a bucolic experience for urban tourists (Hackett 1998, 
57-8). 
In short, the industry and the government consciously worked to lay out the pre-
conditions for the transformation of a low-value, low quality production structure to one 
that could improve considerably and charge higher prices through a combination of 
upgrading and protection, with emphasis on estate wineries that could improve quality.  
In 1981, the highest priced wine was Casabello‟s Pinot Chardonnay, selling for $5.60 
(Miles 1981, 20).  There were also preliminary indications that tourism could be a source 
of growth.  One of the majors in 1980 reported 23,000 visitors and most sales were on 
premises (Miles 1981, 22). 
The industry looked with envy at the example of upgrading in Washington State 
and Oregon that occurred at the same time, and had led to in-state sales of premium wine 
that could compete with California.  This upgrading was based on switching to better 
grape varieties and extension from university partners.  As the 1978 Senate report states: 
“However, the future of a healthy B.C. wine industry will not be determined by 
promotional activity alone. If a wine is below standard it sells only once. In the long run 
domestic wines must compete successfully with imports on the basis of quality and price 
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if they are to survive in the market place (Senate Standing Committee 1978, 41-2, 48 & 
60).”  Other than recommending a grape and wine division be formed at the BC Ministry 
of Agriculture, a plan, including how to get BC wines into appropriate distributional 
channels for BC,  had yet to be worked out (Senate Standing Committee, 104 & 113). 
The result of successful experimentation was the foundation, between 1977-1982, 
of now leading Canadian estate wineries Sumac Ridge, Cedar Creek (formerly Uniake), 
Mission Hill and Gray Monk, as well as Claremont Estate Winery, Vinitera (reorganized 
in 1984 as Okanagan Vineyards), and Divino.  Moreover, 1979 saw the introduction of 
French vinifera varieties.   Despite these significant advances the OKV wine cluster 
remained a relative backwater, with a mere 13 wineries of inconsequential size.  In 1988, 
the estate wineries produced 627,536L, accounting for 2% of wine sales in BC.  
Nonetheless, these same wineries laid the foundation for future success and demonstrated 
the efficacy of public-private partnership in the incipient stages of wine industry 
development (Hickton 2005, 74; Adams 1992, 13-14).   
Until the OKWFS (Okanagan Wine Festival Society), there was no lead agency in 
terms of wine industry tourism.  The Wine Institute, the BC Farm Wineries Association, 
the Okanagan-Similkameen Tourist Association, the BC Tourism Ministry, and various 
Chambers of Commerce all played roles (Hackett 1998, 83-86).  The OKWFS was 
founded in 1988 by a group of 6 wineries and tourism operators around the idea of 
organizing a series of food and wine culinary events.  The main one was the Okanagan 
Fall Wine Festival, which including a competition of local wines (Kingsbury 2004, 40). 
A lack of coordination and planning also reflected some conflicting values, as, for 
example, a Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) spokesperson, 
17 
 
interviewed in 1998, expressed concerns about the loss of farming land to wineries 
(Hackett 1998, 123).   
Transformation through the NAFTA 
 Though the usefulness of public-private networking is notable at this stage it did 
not constitute evidence of a conscious effort to establish an industrial cluster until after 
the ratification of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the precursor for the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1989.  In fact, the precursor of the 
transformation to free trade occurred in 1987, when a GATT panel found for the 
European Community who suggested that provincial liquor boards were unfairly marking 
up wines (Kingsbury 2004, 3).  The decision marked the start of a new era, one that 
would require more direct competition with imports.  The view for the BC industry was 
quite pessimistic at the time, with one analyst stating that the ruling and agreement “have 
left the B.C. wine industry vulnerable and unable to compete.”  As of 1992, there were 21 
BC wineries, with 19 in the OKV (Adams 1992, 2 & 6). 
 The immediate results of the movement towards free trade were to shake up the 
relationships between wineries and grape growers.  Many of the wineries cancelled their 
contracts with grape growers, invoking a force majeure clause in light of the loss of 50% 
of the preferential mark-up 14 months after NAFTA went into effect (Kingsbury 2004, 
38).  Commercial wineries were freed from the 80/20 rule and allowed unlimited access 
to US grapes, while the rules for estate wineries stayed the same.  Market share for BC 
wines fell from 60% in 1988 to 48% in 1991 (Adams 1992, 75 & 78). 
The signing of NAFTA resulted in increased market pressure to raise quality 
standards and there was a broad concern in the Canadian viticulture industry that wine 
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from the Napa Valley could come to dominate the domestic market.  Foremost was the 
fact of the phase out of a price advantage for BC wines.  Previously, BC wines had a 50% 
markup before sale vs. 110% for imported wines; NAFTA meant a phase out of this price 
advantage, gradually over 10 years (Hickton 2005, 10).   
The crisis brought BC wineries, grape growers and the government together for 
extensive consultations on what to do.  On Sept. 21, 1989, the BC Cabinet established the 
Premium Wine Industry Strategy to rigorously raise quality standards in an effort to save 
the industry (Adams 1992, 79-80).  The strategy was consummated in the British 
Columbia Wine Act (Bill 58-1990) which laid out the regulatory groundwork for the 
transformation of the industry.  This bill set up the guidelines for the BC Wine Institute 
(BCWI), appellation standards, and the Vintner‟s Quality Alliance (VQA), which the BC 
provincial government adopted to ensure that all wines labeled as BC wines were made 
from grapes grown in the province and have passed a critical or sensory standard to 
ensure quality.  The creation of a standards system was augmented by a 28 million dollar 
grant from the Canadian Federal government, called the Grape and Wine Sector 
Adjustment Assistance Program (GWSAAP), to provide 8100 dollars per acre to growers 
who removed the old Labrusca varieties in favour of European vinifera varieties.  In fact, 
$27 million went to pay grape growers to uproot their vines and exit the business.  As a 
result, the number of growers dropped from 225 to 90, and 2,308 acres of hybrid and 
Labrusca grapes were removed (BC Wine Institute and Kingsbury 2004, 38-9). 
The VQA (Vintner‟s Quality Alliance) was the first conscious effort to establish a 
standards system and unite the OKV wine industry under one „brand.‟  In the 1990s, the 
new developments attracted a large number of new small wineries who could take 
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advantage of the VQA label, and the realization that climate did not prevent the 
production of high quality wines (Hickton and Padmore 2005, 87).  A number of the 
smaller grape growers transformed themselves into farm wineries, with estate wineries 
aiding in terms of providing supplies in smaller quantities than commercially available 
(Kingsbury 2004, 39).  A rush of investment from Eastern Canadian and international 
companies from the late 1990s sent land prices soaring (Hickton 2005, 12).  A 1994 
economic study of the industry reported a remarkable transformation- with revenues and 
profits increasing significantly from 1988, and with estate wineries growing by 66% in 
revenues over the same period (Ross 1995, 61).   
The GWSAAP program also gave $1 million to help establish and finance the BC 
Wine Institute for 5 years, from 1990.  The original head of the BCWI was also the 
founding Chairman of the BCEWA.  The BCWI was launched in 1990 by 19 founding 
members and MAFF (Adams 1992, 80).  The BCWI originally shared office space in 
Kelowna in the OKV with the BC Grape Marketing Board and the Association of BC 
Grapegrowers (ABCGG).  It had 1 full time and 1 part-time employee.  By the end of 
1996, these grew to include an executive director and assistant in Vancouver and an 
administrative director and 5 staff in Kelowna (Kingsbury 2004, 39-41).  The 1990 Act 
gave multiple roles to the BCWI, including setting standards, including testing, for 
labeling and advertising; the ability to raise levies upon membership; promotion and 
marketing; R&D and developing a database of information.  At this time, all wineries 
considered it a legal obligation to join the BCWI (Kingsbury 2004, 54).  The early 
impression of the BCWI‟s VQA and marketing efforts seems uniformly positive, as 
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information about quality spread throughout the BC market (Kingsbury 2004, 61-3).  By 
1998, there were some 31 wineries in the OKV (Hackett 1998, 55).   
A 2004 Report by the BC Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (16) notes 
the following breakdown of BC wineries: 
Large Wineries 
-Andrés Wines Ltd. 
-Calona Vineyards 
-Mission Hill Family Estate 




-Burrowing Owl Vineyards 
-Cedar Creek Estate Winery 
-Gray Monk Estate Winery 
-Hawthorn Mountain Vineyards 
-Quails‟ Gate Estate Winery 
-Summerhill Estate Pyramid Winery 
-Inniskillin Okanagan Vineyard Inc. 
-Gehringer Brothers Estate Wienry 
-Domaine de Chaberton Estate Winery 
-Mt. Boucherie Estate Winery 
-NK‟MIP Cellars 
-Tinhorn Creek Vineyards 




Over 80+ existed as of 2004 
 
 All except Victoria and Domaine de Chaberton of the above are in the Okanagan 
Valley.  Andrés was renamed Andrew Peller Ltd. in 2006 and is run by the grandson of 
the founder.  There are other wineries in the Gulf Islands, Vancouver Island, and in other 
areas of BC (such as the Kootenays), but the numbers are far too small to consider in 
terms of clusters.  So, even from an early stage, the general structure of the OKV wine 
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industry is a very flat pyramid- with a few (<10) large wineries, a few more (<20) estate 
wineries, and the rest being very small operations. 
Support Institutions 
 While there are the beginnings of a set of support institutions for the emerging 
cluster, they are still in the nascent stage, and under-resourced as compared with other 
wine clusters, such as New Zealand, Australia, and the U.S. 
Regulatory Bodies 
The main regulatory bodies for the wine industry in BC are the Liquor Control 
and Licensing Branch, that controls where and how alcohol is consumed, the Liquor 
Distribution Branch, that controls the supply; and the new BC Wine Authority.  The 
regulatory system has a strong element of protection for local industry.  The BC Wine 
Authority was set up in 2005 to take over the wine standards and tasting part of the VQA 
program from the BC Wine Institute (which still controls the marketing side).  It has a 3 
member board and a Chair that are independent and conduct taste tests as well as 
ensuring that regulatory standards in the production of BC VQA wine are met.  Following 
is a description of the key support institutions. 
Pacific Agri-Food Research Centre (PARC) 
 
 PARC is located in Summerland and conducts research on tree fruits and grapes.  
Wine research at PARC includes fruit/wine quality, pest and disease management, 
environmental physiology, which they state includes nutrient, water relations and 
response to climate, and biochemistry of fruit and wine.  PARC has received support 
from the BC Wine Grape Council and the BC Wine Institute in the past for research. 
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 Until 1994, there was a single research scientist responsible for grape growing 
projects, but he was more academically oriented.  When the scientist moved to Brock 
University‟s centre supporting Ontario wineries, as a result of the position being cut, 
industry protested.  In 2000, a new scientist who is a graduate of the renowned UC Davis 
wine school, came to occupy the position.  There are in addition 10 researchers, 14 
technicians and students and visiting workers.  Local wineries now have more of an input 
into the research (Hickton and Padmore 2005, 96).   
BC Wine Institute 
 The Institute was established in 1990 by an act of the BC legislature, reflecting a 
desire for the public and private sectors to collaborate towards developing a competitive 
wine industry.  The aforementioned project of replacing existing grapes with vinifera 
varieties started the work.  The current functions are marketing and research, with a focus 
on VQA wines.  BCWI also appoints members of the VQA stores.  Members pay a levy 
so that they have a direct input into activities and the research agenda.  Other services are 
provided on a fee per service basis.  Members gain access for their products to 19 VQA 
stores, marketing efforts, and learning opportunities.  However, Hickton (2005, 34) notes 
that not all wineries are included, and there is no enforcement power for industry-wide 
initiatives.  As we discuss below, the BCWI‟s role has transformed, in line with its 
reliance on VQA store revenues.   
Association of BC Grape Growers 
 The ABCGG was founded in 1961 as an industry lobby and marketing group 
(Kingsbury 2004, 3). 
Okanagan Wine Festival Society (OKWS) 
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 This group grew in the 1980s to promote the wine industry.  In 1994, a Spring 
wine festival was started, and in 2002 a summer festival.  The OKWS has helped to 
promote quality improvements in the industry, by bringing in international judges to their 
festival competitions. 
BC Wine Grape Council 
 The BC Wine Grape Council was formed as a research body to replace the BCWI 
Research and Development Committee, which no longer had funds to continue.  The 
Council was set up through an industry-wide referendum.
4
  Funds come entirely from 
membership who pay in equal amounts, with a budget of < $5000 in 2004.  The 
Association traditionally met at PARC or one of its members (Kingsbury 2004, 114-5).  
The Council has a research and development committee and now hosts its own annual 
conference. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF)  
 
There is currently only 1 employee from MAFF involved in the industry, and he 
covers both grape and fruits.  He spends most of his time on R&D and other industry 
boards. 
University of British Columbia 
 The UBC has a wine research centre devoted to grape and wine research in 
Vancouver, including scientific studies of both grape growing and winemaking.  There is 
also a second campus, UBC Okanagan, located in Kelowna, where research also takes 
place, and which offers technical training courses. 
Okanagan College 
                                                 
4
 Correspondence with Bill Collings, Jan. 2011. 
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 Okanagan College, with its primary campus in Penticton, offers wine assistant and 
related courses for training. 
Others 
 There are numerous groups in the OKV that seem to have informal lives (and 
occasional deaths) of their own.  Among the noteworthy are: The Estate Winery 
Association, which seems now to be mostly an informal group of the larger estate 
wineries who meet occasionally to share information.  The British Columbia 
Winegrowers Association appears to be a group of small and medium sized wineries to 
speak out on issues of common interest.  For example, the Association has complained 
about the need for more accurate labeling (see issues below). 
Sub-Regional Groups- see Lack of Coordination Section 
Current Industry Issues 
Introduction 
 
 As described above, market changes and policy responses precipitated the growth 
and evolution of the OKV winemaking industry.  While comparative advantage allows 
for beneficial conditions for the making of wine, changes were necessary in the policy 
environment to create an industry.  The first key set of policies were government 
protection of local grapegrowing and wine industries.  The second set of policies, 
precipitated by market changes as well as the Canadian government entering into a free 
trade agreement with the US, was focused on upgrading.  Policies in this case included a 
downgraded but still important element of protection, massive investment in creating 
estate wineries of high quality, and tourism promotion.  One scientist interviewed also 
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suggested that climate change allowed for the introduction of new varieties, permitting 
upgrading, which sounds plausible, and was reinforced by several long-standing 
interviewees who noted changes in the possibility for the cultivation of vinifera grapes in 
several areas previously deemed too cold.  The fruits of these efforts are remarkable 
success in both the proliferation and revenues of the industry, and the Valley has the 
makings of a quiet gold rush.   
A large expansion of the industry took place as industrial giants (such as Vincor) 
and institutional investors have taken note of the growth and bought up properties.  In 
addition, a large number of interviewees highlighted the widescale conversion of fruit 
farmers into grape growers and grape growers starting their own wineries (with some 
fruit growers bypassing the intermediate step).  There are also a strikingly large number 
of winery owners who come to the business with no background in the industry, not 
necessarily to strike it rich but out of a passion for wine.  Many interviewees described 
the dedication that has led them to entrust their life savings toward the idyllic dream of 
running a winery and vineyard.  On the other hand, long-timers in the industry warned 
that should the rapid growth of the market decelerate, there could be shake-outs.   
Already there are rumours of many (up to 30) wineries being put up for sale, 
including one long-time family business with several wineries declaring bankruptcy.  
And there is certainly a gradual recognition by entrants about the arduous and 
tempestuous nature of the business.  Several interviewees remarked that it is really more 
like farming than winemaking, and subject to all the volatilities (weather, pests, disease, 
etc.) of that occupation.  One interviewee, coming from the financial sector, remarked, 
“I‟ve never worked so hard in my life.  I had no idea it was going to be this labour-
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intensive.”  This has led several of the smaller wineries, as well as a growing proportion 
of absentee investors, to hire consultants to run their wineries.  Competition and 
consumer preferences should be allowed to decide who in the industry survives, yet, there 
are still a large number of pressing issues that both the public sector and the industry will 
need to confront in the foreseeable future for the industry as a whole to succeed in BC. 
Market Conditions and Vulnerabilities 
 The long-term growth of the Canadian wine industry, as a national market place, 
is clearly established by the Figure below.  
Figure Growth in BC and National Demand 
 
Annual Survey of Manufactures by Statistics Canada 
 
 Evidently, the average consumption of wine increases substantially over time, 
with an increase in the national average consumption between 1983-95 of 3.36 litres per 
adult, according to Hope-Ross (2006).  The boost can be attributed to changing consumer 
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trends influenced by an increased quality of wines resulting from greater availability of 
US wines as a result of NAFTA.  This trend must be kept in perspective because as 
Hope-Ross (2006, 9) notes: “Canada is still very much a beer-drinking nation.  But more 
and more, wines are making inroads. In 1993, each Canadian adult bought, on average, 
10.6 litres of wine. By 2005, sales had increased by 3.6 litres to 14.2 litres per adult. At 
the same time, beer sales fell from 91.3 litres per adult to 88.1 litres, a decline of 3.2 
litres.” 5   
BC supply has followed the positive trajectory of demand as demonstrated in the 
following figure. 
Figure BC Upward Supply Trends 
 
B.C. Wine Institute: http://www.winebc.com/quickfacts.php, Accessed Jan 25, 2011; short ton =2,000 lbs. 
The BC Wine Institute puts the value of the 2009 grape crop at C$40,205,170.  
The growth in annual VQA wine sales between 1992 and 2010, from 6.8 million dollars 
                                                 
5




to 182.1. million dollars, indicates the increased importance of the provincial and 
domestic market for BC wines
6
.  The VQA system‟s ability to improve quality likely 
helped to push overall gains in sales.  By 2007 BC VQA wines represented 19.9 % of 
total BC wine sales and Canadian wines as a whole represented 42.4% of total BC wine 
sales
7
. of the industry is corroborated by increases in acreage of vinifera grapes, tonnage 
yields and value of the yields.  Notable is the increase over a short period of time and the 
extent of the growth as primarily occurring in the OKV, regardless of the size of the 
winery.  
The BC Wine Institute sees VQA as evidence of its success.  Executive Director 
Mile Prodan states, “with over 190 grape wineries now in BC, and several licenses 
pending, clearly consumer‟s have choice. A definitive factor in consumer selection is 
quality, a standard of which the BC Wine Institute (BCWI) works to promote through the 
"Wines of British Columbia (BC VQA)" - an “Appellation of Origin” system that 
guarantees authenticity of origin and stipulates minimum quality standards and is 
regulated by the British Columbia Wine Authority (BCWA).  As the preferred premium 
wine brand in BC, over the past five years, annual BC VQA wine sales (in BC) have 
increased by $40 million, and, with an average yearly growth in provincial BC VQA 
sales of 9% over the last 5 years, clearly consumers have embraced BC VQA.” 
Vulnerability #1: Market Saturation 
 Undoubtedly, phenomenal growth in demand has fueled the BC wine industry‟s 
remarkable expansion in the last 2 decades.   
                                                 
6
 John Schreiner for 1992 figure and BWI 2010 Annual report for 2010, 
http://www.winebc.com/library/reports/2010_Annual_Report.pdf. 
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Source: BC Wine Institute, http://www.winebc.com/quickfacts.php, accessed Jan. 25, 
2011 
 
The figure below, based on our constructed database of information about Okanagan 
wineries, demonstrates the acceleration in the creation of new wineries, especially after 




Figure Increasing Number of Wineries Founded in the Okanagan 
 
Notes: author calculations own database; total datapoints = 125; updated as of June 2010 
 
 These trends are matched by phenomenal increases in grape acreage in the 
province, as demonstrated by the figure below. 
 




 Longtime industry insider Bill Collings states, “There are about 10,000 acres  
planted to grapes in the province, most in the Okanagan Valley.  At 12 million litres, this 
means that on average, each acre yields only about two tons per acre.  Normal production 
per acre is estimated at between 3 and 4 tons per acres.  At 3.5 tons per acre, the wine 
yield would be 21 million litres.  Full grape production would be a disaster for the BC 
industry.  The industry is currently having difficulty selling 12 million litres; 21 million 
litres will result in huge unsold inventories.” 
It is important to note, furthermore, that increases in demand have been spread 
through both domestic and imported supply, with imported wines experiencing a higher 
rate of increase. 
Figure Demand for Imports Outpaces Demand for BC Wines 
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If increases in prices and quality continue to evolve, imported brands are more likely to 
capture this additional educated demand, as reflected in the following figure. 
Imported Wines Fetch a Premium vs. BC Wines 
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B.C. Liquor Distribution Branch Annual Reports 
 
Interviewees reported positive recent results- 52% reported increases in revenues 
over 2009-10, while 21% said that they stayed the same, and just 12% claimed a 
decrease.  While some interviewees were optimistic and confident about the future of the 
BC wine market, most were skeptical that it can continue apace.  The question becomes, 
then, at what point the growth will decelerate or reach a plateau.  Since the Lower 
Mainland (Greater Vancouver) remains the sole anchor of demand for the BC wine 
industry, any changes in that market, including a likely economic slowdown in the near 
future, must affect the positive trajectory of growth, and with it the fortunes of the myriad 
new wineries.  Obviously, demand growth has natural limits by the overall size of the 
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Vancouver market; a number of interviewees opine that supply is already beginning to 
surpass demand.  The result will be ramped up competition.  While the attractive result 
for consumers will be lower prices and improved quality, the large number of entrants in 
the “boutique category,” catering towards small market niches of customers willing to 
pay higher prices suggests that some shakeout is likely to occur.  A large number of 
interviewees agreed with this general premise, though they each thought that their own 
products could distinguish themselves enough to thrive.   
Vulnerability #2 Increasing Costs of Land and Inputs 
 A lot of the vulnerability of the industry to demand slowdown or plateau is that 
business plans for the new wave of wineries are based on the present revenue stream.  In 
fact, the cost of land has risen astronomically in the OKV, meaning that the capital 
burden of most of the wineries in the OKV, established over the last decade, has risen 
accordingly. 
 One industry source states, “The growers of the day sold their properties after 
taking the $8,100/acre subsidy and bailed out.  Good vineyard properties sold in the early 
1990's for as low as $2,000/acre.  By 1993/94 the price had increased to just over 
$4,000/acre for raw vineyard land.  In 2002 the price in the south OKV had increased to 
about $40,000/acre (planted).  It peaked in 2008 at about $120,000/acre (planted) but has 
settled back now to an estimated $80,000 - $90,000/acre (planted).”  Another real estate 
agent in the Valley states that winery and vineyard prices rose constantly from 1992-
2004, then dropped from 2005-7.  An influx of Albertan money “willing to purchase at 
any price” was responsible for the rapid inflation.  However, there are signs that bubble is 
bursting.  Oliver and Narmata land prices are now half ($90,000 and $100,000/acre 
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respectively) of what they were at their peak in 2004.  According to this source, those 
who bought property in the 1990s are generally “ok,” having had time to establish brands 
when the market was expanding.  New entrants to the market (from 2006) are “in 
trouble,” however.  Declining demand due to economic slowdown, and newly stringent 
drinking and driving laws have hurt industry and restaurant sales, with wine tourism 
down possibly by 20%.  More accessible tourist transport could be an emerging solution.  
According to the source, there are 20 wineries and vineyards for sale, though many are 
not publicly listed; he expects the number could reach 50 in the coming years. 
Most wineries in the Okanagan are quite small, making cost reduction 
challenging; 45% of our sample owned less than 20 acres.  Yet, surprisingly few 
interviewees complain about a lack of access to finance.  But this may reflect the thus far 
propitious conditions both in terms of market forces and growing conditions over the last 
decade.  Indeed, the 7-8 year preparation time of the vineyard, and the likely even longer 
lead time to establishing a brand reputation, along with the quite low volumes of 
production of the majority of the wineries in the OKV, and the reliance on outside 
management teams and consultants, bring into question how many can thrive or even 
survive over the long-run.  The logical response to market saturation would be to 
improve quality and to seek out new markets.  In the rest of the paper, we discuss why 
such an adjustment will be extremely challenging without changes to the industry and to 
government policy.  The end result of the skyrocketing of real estate prices in the OKV, 
as well as the demonstration effect of success is the growing spread of wineries to the far 
flung corners of the Valley.  The table below gives our calculations on the geographic 
spread of the OKV wineries over time. 
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Falls Oliver Osoyoos Cawston Total 
1932-80 1 2 2   1 1     7 
1980-89   3 2 1 2 2   1 11 
1990-
1999   6 2 10 2 11   1 32 
2000-
2010 3 11 8 23 4 12 4 9 74 
                  124 
Notes: based on author database, 125 datapoints, as of June 2010; Kelowna incl. West 
Kelowna and West Bank; Summerland inc. Peachland; Penticton incl. Naramata; Ok 
Falls = Okanagan Falls, incl Kaleden;  Cawston incl. Keremeos 
 
This table demonstrates that as the price of land around Kelowna has increased, 
the number of wineries has spread out as well.  During the 1990s, the spread was 
concentrated in the Penticton and Oliver areas.  In the last decade, these areas have 
continued to grow at a hot pace, but there is also growth at the geographic margins of the 
OKV: to the north in Lake Country; in the more isolated area of Summerland and 
Peachland (between Kelowna and Penticton); south to the US border in Osoyoos, and, 
most recently, west, to the Similkameen Valley (Cawston and Keremeos).  A few new 
wineries are being established in new areas for winemaking, from the Edge of the Earth 
winery in Spallumcheen and a couple in Salmon Arm, both several hours north of the 
OKV, to a few coming on line recently in the Kootenay region (far southeastern BC).  
There are discussions of other regions coming into play in the future, such as Kamloops.  
Several winemakers and other experts with long-term experience in the industry pointed 
out that the high cost of land is leading to a higher risk profile as more marginal lands 
are being brought into play, with potential quality and environmental problems resulting.  
And all wineries will be subject to this factor- 24% of our sample said that they 
purchased 21-50% of grapes off estate, and another 42% said they bought 51-100%. 
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Vulnerability #3: Lack of Alternative Markets 
While the market growth of BC wine is impressive, it may be built upon faulty 
premises.  Of our sample 76% said they sold 90-100% of their wines in BC.  Therefore, 
lack of diverse markets is clearly a huge vulnerability for BC wines that led a number of 
interviewees to express their concern about the future of the industry.  Most farm/small 
family wineries cited tourism as their main source of revenue.  Estate wineries generally 
said that the ability to sell directly to restaurants was their key market.  All rely most 
heavily upon tourism, principally locals from Vancouver and, to a lesser extent, Alberta.  
Up to now, BC wineries have expanded upon the basis of the local market, however a 
number of interviewees express concern that, given the large increases in the supply of 
wine and number of wineries, the saturation point is coming close.  It is interesting to 
note that there are a few new wineries in the OKV who sell only on-line, such as Pentage 
and Soaring Eagle.  I suspect that this reflects the heavy reliance of many boutique and 
estate wineries on direct restaurant sales.  There are a few other new ones who do not 
seem to be open to tourists, such as Intrigue Wines and Pacific Breeze.  Some of these 
new entrants have mailing addresses in Vancouver, suggesting that they may not even 
own land in the Valley.  A significant number of interviewees confirmed reliance on 
restaurant sales, and stated that they did not bother to sell in liquor stores because of the 
hassle and pricing system of the BC Liquor Distribution Branch.  Indeed, several  
interviewees noted that restaurants had already cut back on purchases overall and that 
their attempts to move much beyond the principal price point of $20 were halting or 
failing at best, as Vancouver buyers tighten their belts due to economic downturn.  In 
addition British Columbia introduced tougher drinking and driving laws in September 
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2010.  Many restaurants have reported a decline in wine/liquor sales since the new laws 
took effect. 
Vulnerability # 4: Heavy reliance on Tourism 
Tourism is the lifeblood of the OKV wine industry, and so presents the same 
vulnerability as reliance on BC restaurant sales for estate and boutique wineries.  In our 
survey, there was virtual unanimity that tourism was “extremely important” to wineries.  
Many of the wineries, especially the smaller and small estate ones, do not have the same 
sense of urgency about exports outside of BC because tourism is by far their most 
important source of income, and has been a reliable source of revenues thus far.  Their 
investments go primarily into facilities to attract more tourists and to get them to spend 
more, thus their policy priority would be to put more money and effort into that area.  
Thus, tourists are their primary source of information and feedback for new products.  
Reliance on just one revenue stream in a market where many suppliers are entering is, 
needless to say, another potential vulnerability. 
A 2008 study by Tourism BC Canada surveyed 1,977 customers at 7 wineries in 
the OKV: Mission Hill, Cedar Creek, Elephant Island, Soaring Eagle, Tinhorn Creek, 
Burrowing Owl, and Nk‟Mip.  They found that 50% of travelers were from BC, another 
26% from Alberta, 13% from elsewhere in Canada, and just 5% from the US.  Most were 
between 35-64 years old, with 27% being 45-54.  Almost three quarters (74%) had a 
college or technical diploma; 52% had household incomes of at least $100,000, while 
another 25% had incomes between $65,000-$99,999.  Over three quarters (79%) were 
repeat visitors.  Thus, it is clear that the target market for BC wine is of a relatively high 
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stature.  More marketing and educational efforts could raise prices for this market as BC 
wineries move to improve their quality. 
Vulnerability #5: Dependence on Regulatory Protection 
Protectionism revolves around the fact that the BC Liquor Distribution Branch 
(LDB) has a monopoly position over the supply of all alcohol in the province.  After 
national counterparts, Ontario‟s LCBO and Québec‟s Societé d‟Alcools due Québec, it is 
the 3rd largest buying consortium for alcohol in the world.
8
  No other agent can import or 
sell alcohol in BC without the express permission of the LDB.  The LDB sells the vast 
majority of alcohol in the province through its BC Liquor Stores, including not only 
individuals but the pubs and restaurants, clubs, etc who purchase from them.  According 
to the LDB, there are 1360 retail liquor stores in BC, 200 of which are government-run, 
and 700 of which are retail stores operating under license from the Liquor Control and 
Licensing Branch.  Effectively, then, the LDB is able to set the prices for all alcohol with 
a high markup price, which provides the provincial government with a huge revenue 
stream.   
Just as important are the ways that the LDB controls supply.  First, the LDB 
controls shelf space in its stores.  It uses this power to show preference to BC wines.
9
  
Secondly, all imports go through an arduous process whereby an import agent must fill 
out reams of paperwork asking the LDB to order the wine on their behalf from the 
winery.  The wine must be shipped to a bonded warehouse and can only be processed 
through when LDB receives a valid order for the wine from a customer (private store, 
restaurant, or government store).  This generally means considerable delay, possibly 
                                                 
8
 Tony Wilson, Why BC‟s liquor board gets away with complacency, Mar. 12, 2010, 
wwww.lawyersweekly.ca, 13. 
9
 Robert Todd, Labelling wars heat up, Oct. 19, 2009, www.lawtimesnews.com. 
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months, before the product can be placed on shelves.  VQA wine is also exempt from BC 
LDB mark ups.  The end result of this system, as columnist Anthony Gismondi writes, is 
“Despite what you read about our burgeoning local industry and the rise in quality wine 
production, the best (BC) bottles are seldom seen in government stores because local 
producers have the freedom to sell direct and avoid the massive tax levied on wine sold in 
government stores and private wine shops.”10  He refers to direct sales to restaurants, on-
line, and at retail winery shops, which are exempt from price markups and taxes.   
Thirdly, Canadian customs regulations prevent day trippers from bringing back 
any wine without paying heavy duties at the border.  This has led to complaints by US 
producers and government officials.  Canadians must be out of the country at least 48 
hours before they can bring just 2 bottles of wine back duty free.  Fourth, the LDB sets 
the prices for all items, at a high markup including processing fees, which is estimated to 
be over 100% of the retail price in other areas.  A successful GATT complaint by the 
European Union led to the abolition of the favourable markup treatment for BC wines by 
the LDB.  However, even BC wine that is sold in government stores receives a portion of 




The above demonstrate amply the precarious nature of the BC wine industry in its 
reliance on provincial regulatory protectionism.  A slight change in one of these 
regulatory aspects based on external complaint or some other source, such as deciding to 
tax restaurant or direct sales, would have profound effects on the entire industry.  Indeed, 
complaints by the European Union (EU) in 1988 about preferential treatment led to a 
                                                 
10
 Anthony Gismondi, Best of BC Release, Nov. 11, 2006, Vancouver Sun , found at: 
http://www.gismondionwine.com/articlelist.php?grp=5 
11
 See Mark Hicken, BC Wine and Trade Agreement Trouble, Feb. 16, 2010,  www.winelaw.ca  
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separate agreement where Canada agreed to reduce import duties.  However, the issue has 
not gone away.  Complaints about wine have been brought up in various international 
fora, such as a 1991 complaint by the US about protectionism in beer, in which Australia 
complained, and a 1998 Trade Policy Review of the World Trade Organization, in which 
Spain, the EU, Chile, and Australia all raised questions about provincial treatment of 
wine, particularly how listing decisions were made.  The EU and Canada reached an 
updated agreement in regard to wine and beer in 2008.  In both the EU and the CUSFTA 
(Canada-US Free Trade Agreement), the principle of national treatment is embraced.  
This could be the basis for future challenges. 
Industry participants seem to take the status quo for granted, however.  The 
principal complaint/suggestion by the wineries interviewed in regard to public policy 
was, not surprisingly, that taxes should be lowered and the government should “stay out” 
of the industry.  Several said that the sole role of government was to “gouge” industry as 
one put it.  However, there are several other intriguing issues worth discussing. 
The 1973 Agricultural Land Commission Act established the Provincial 
Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR) and the Agricultural Land Commission to manage the 
reserve, in response to concerns that farm land would disappear.  The reserve set aside 
land exclusively for farm use, including all land then zoned as agricultural under 
municipal bylaws (Hackett 1998, 22).  Interviewees complained about restrictions based 
on ALR on their ability to offer full restaurant services, perhaps reflecting the power of 




Interviewees also express a great deal of consternation at “laggards” holding 
quality improvements and reputation behind.  In particular, some medium and smaller 
wineries would like adjustments towards more truthful labeling.  The controversy 
revolves around the “cellared in Canada” label whereby several large wineries import 
bulk wine and then bottle it here.  In fact, the BC Wine Institute states on its website that 
cellared in Canada wines are the best selling category of wines, ahead of VQA sales.
12
  
The label is considered by critics to be disingenuous, and the BC LDB has responded by 
separating out such wines from its BC wines shelf space into a separate space for bottled 
and/or blended in Canada.  The wines are apparently good revenue producers, and they 
avoid the morass of import hassles described above, so they are likely to continue.  One 
insider from a company that produces such wines states “cellared in Canada wines are a 
big part of our portfolio and provide high paying jobs to numerous BC residents. The 
province could not support the agricultural base required to supply such wines and it 
allows us to compete with low cost bottle imports.”  One interpretation is that producers 
of such wines see them as competing in a different category than BC estate wines.  
Perhaps that distinction needs to be made clearer to clear up the controversy.  On the 
other hand, Mark Hicken‟s important blog on wine law in Canada, www.winelaw.ca, 
suggests that the issue will not die down, and may be challenged on the basis that federal 
law requires a listing of countries of origin.  However, since blend mixes are changing 
according to price movements, businesses will resist this (May 12, 2010). 
Almost universally, interviewees mentioned the difficulties of interprovincial 
shipping and sales (often called “exports” by industry participants) as a major obstacle to 
expansion of wine markets.  However, an inside sources states that industry lobbying for 
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liberalization of interprovincial shipping that any changes in this regard, according to 
WTO and “national treatment” provisions, would have to be allowed for all foreign 
wines (or their agents), as well.  On the other hand, the industry is split among large, 
medium and smaller wineries, with the latter two citing quite limited ability to export 
(particularly internationally), thus they do not support any major policy or industry 
initiatives in this area. 
The shipping issue is based on the 1928 Importation of Intoxicating Liquor Act, 
passed at the federal level, that prevents interprovincial sales unless it is to government 
agencies, i.e. the provincial distribution monopolies.  The Act was passed in the context 
of the Prohibition era when provinces adopted varying levels of bans on alcohol.  While 
that is no longer a valid reason, clearly the revenues enjoyed by the monopoly 
government distribution boards are, with BC‟s LDB providing around $800 million in 
annual revenue.  BC wineries who had shipped to customers in Alberta, Ontario, and 
Manitoba, have received warning letters from the provincial governments there. 
13
   
Vulnerability #6 Difficulties in Learning How to Export 
Exporting would seem the logical solution.  However, there are major problems 
with recognition of BC wines in global markets.  A review of 424 wines rated in Wine 
Spectator between 1989-2008 revealed the limited reach of Canadian wines into global 
markets.  Wine Spectator is the premier source of international ratings for the industry. 
About 2/3 of the wines reviewed were from Ontario, and the other 1/3 from the 
Okanagan.  A third of all Canadian wines rated are icewines, and 41% of Ontario wines 
are, vs. just 14% for BC, showing the greater range of varietals of the latter.  This 
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suggests that Canada is known principally for icewines, and these are more likely to be 
rated.  We see that the average score of Canadian wines reviewed is in the “good” range, 
80-90.  The average price of Ontario wines is considerably higher than BC wines, at $37 
vs. $24, likely reflecting again the premium afforded to icewines.
14
   
Exporting globally is even more problematic, as a number of interviewees suggest 
that few BC companies are able to produce adequate volumes for export markets and that 
they were not competitive at international price points with producers who “exploited 
cheap labour,” such as Chile.  Only one winery expressed that they did any systematic 
research on prospective markets and trends.  Hope-Ross notes “Canadian wine still faces 
aggressive competition from foreign products, ranging from South Africa to Australia 
and Central Europe. At first glance, the growth in Canadian wine sales is impressive. 
However, most of this increase has been in sales of imported wines. Sales of imported 
wines have increased much more than sales of domestic wines, both in terms of value and 
volume…” (Hope-Ross 2006, 10).  In sum, with the exception of icewines, Canadian 
products are still quite limited in their ability to export.  Canadian wines lack any clear 
reputation or branding at this point (Hickton 2005, 41).  Interviews with a couple of 
winemakers who were producing wines for export markets revealed a perceived lack of 
policy support for such efforts, especially stark if one compares it to the high level of 
export promotional efforts of other winemaking clusters.  One interviewee suggested that 
the Federal/Provincial government with industry association support could do much more 
in terms of promoting knowledge of BC wines around the globe, including Canada, 
through renting space in business fairs in order establish a reputation.  He also suggested 
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that aid in financing exports, with market research, and finding trading partners could 
also be extremely helpful.   
One logical solution would be to brand OKV wines around a clear varietal, such 
as Argentine Malbecs and Williamette Valley (Oregon) Pinot Noirs, to establish a high 
end global niche.  However, interviewees universally reported that there is almost no 
likelihood that a regional specialization around a varietal will take hold given the variety 
of mesoclimates in the Okanagan and the changing sources of grape supplies.  Almost 
universally, winemakers cited their interest in organic growing and sustainability, 
something that could be taken up for support by support institutions, but it is unclear as to 
whether an exporting market niche upon such a basis could be established.  Several 
winemakers interviewed expressed that they had been approached by Asian buyers for 
China and Japan, but that the prices were so low and the channels so unclear as to make it 
not worthwhile.   
In response to earlier versions of this report, Janet Dorozynski of the federal Dept. 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) contacted the author and pointed to 
the National Export Strategy Working Group for wine that she is a part of.  The group 
also includes Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, the Canadian Vintner‟s Association 
(CVA), and the BC Wine Institute, and several large Canadian wineries and corporations. 
In May 2009, DFAIT announced that it was spending US$81,000 during the first 
year of a 3-5 year campaign to promote Canadian wine exports.  The goal is to double 
exports from their 2007 volume of 3 million litres and US$20.1 million values.  The 
strategy is based on the Export Strategy Group‟s study of other countries.  CVA President 
Dan Paszkowski stated, “We looked at Australia, New Zealand and other countries that 
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aren't that far ahead of us in terms of export growth but have national strategies that really 
helped their wineries move in tandem into exports."
15
  The strategy focuses getting 
Canadian wines into trade fairs and competitions, and targeting several identified key 
markets in large international cities.  The strategy appears to be based on a consultant‟s 
report by Susan O‟Dell and Associates (DFAIT 2009).  The report (pp.13-16) reinforces 
the governance issues cited throughout this report:  
 Export initiatives continue to be sporadic and one-offs, not contributing to 
sustained sale; allocated funding (by the Federal Govt.) is not fully spent; 
 The 2 regions (Ontario and BC) are “ separate silos diluting export 
effectiveness; potential partners are confused about how to help industry; 
and the greatest risk is the strategy may not be “actively embraced and 
implemented by the regional and national associations 
Vulnerability #7 Lack of Coordination  
 
The BC wine industry is hardly a cluster in the sense of creating shared goods that 
benefit across firms.  The lack of interaction in part reflects the nature of the market.  One 
winemaker interviewed puts it, “Okanagan is unique from other regions because of its 
domestic focus. So there is direct competition and people are careful of information 
sharing.”  Hickton (2005, 16) notes that despite the influx of outside investment, the 
OKV on the whole has a culture of social relationships revolving around kinship ties, 
reflecting the family ownership background behind the origins of many of the wineries.  
Much of the training is therefore tacit, now being passed on to a second generation 
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 “Canadian Government Helps Domestic Wineries Step onto the World Stage” Wine Business Monthly 
May 15, 2009, found at: http://www.winebusiness.com/wbm/?go=getArticle&dataId=66045 
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(Hickton 2005, 16).  A number of winemakers interviewed suggest Oregon and 
California as touchstones of best practices, rather than any local firm. 
 The size of the OKV, 2 hours to drive from the northern to the southern vineyards, 
prevents the development of a strong informal culture.  The BC Wine Institute lists 5 
different agricultural sub-regions based on days of sunshine and soil characteristics, 
leading to different optimalities for varieties: Kelowna, Penticton/Naramata, Okanagan 
Falls, Oliver/Golden Mile, and Black Sage/Osoyoos.  There is some interaction through 
the aforementioned support institutions, but the OKV can not really be considered a 
cluster.  Several winemakers said they interacted with wineries outside their area 
primarily because of former employment, but on the whole the level of interaction is 
quite limited. 
 To analyze the level of social organization, part of our survey asked for the level 
and strength of ties that wineries had with other wineries.  We then created social 
network maps anonymizing the responses using the following coding: coding ID; 
Location (Kelowna, Oliver, Okanagan Falls, Summerland, and Lake Country); Size 
(Small <20 acres, M 21-50, L 51-100, XL >100); and Year started selling wine or 
founding  (Early before 1998, Recent 1998-2005, and New 2006-present).  We use these 
maps to illustrate our points from the interviews. 
The level of social organization depends greatly on the size of the winery and its 
location in the OKV.  In Kelowna, is a domination of large and estate wineries, with a 
handful of family wineries, none of which are geographically concentrated.  The large 
early wineries in Kelowna and Lake Country seem to have ties across the OKV.  Though 
the latter group has less ties, they are not geographically bound. 
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Figure Social Networks of Early Extra Large Kelowna Winery (12KXLE) 
 
 

























In general, small and medium-sized wineries have far fewer ties.  Small wineries 
in Cawston and Kelowna are relatively isolated.  One small winemaker in Kelowna said 
he/she felt “surrounded” by larger wineries.  One winemaker said, “I sometimes chat with 
some of the local winemakers at the local pub when I run across them,” indicating the 
haphazard nature of social interactions in the industry.  Several indicated that only once 
in a blue moon did they even interact with neighbours, such as to borrow equipment.  




Figure Social Networks of New Small Kelowna Winery (3KSN) and Early 
Small Winery in Cawston (17CSE) 
 
 
So, there really are few cross-valley ties.  Instead, our field research indicates 
smaller subcultures of informal networks among similar wineries that are within about a 
20 minute drive of each other.  These are reflected in the current move towards sub-
appellations, such as Golden Mile, Black Sage and Naramata Bench, where a handful of 
firms are moving towards both informal ties and cooperation in marketing.  The 
Naramata Bench near Penticton, made up of some 25 long-standing estate wineries 
clustered together geographically, is the best organized group, and is cited by several of 










area is Red Rooster, which was bought in recent years by Andrew Peller Estates 
(formerly Andrés).  Naramata is working towards joint marketing and meets on a regular 
basis, informally.  These efforts are reflected in a high level of local social capital. 




 The conditions are not good for either extending the Naramata Bench 
organization or recreating it elsewhere.  To the north of Penticton comes Summerland, 
with just a handful of estate and family wineries.  South of Pentiction is Okanagan Falls, 
with just a handful of wineries, followed by Oliver with a mix of family, estate and large 
wineries (including Vincor‟s Jackson-Triggs), and Osoyoos which is even more spread 










tracts for wineries in the north Okanagan.  The wineries around Oliver and Osoyoos have 
created the South Okanagan Wineries Association.  Within this area, there is movement 
towards sub-appellation in the Golden Mile and Black Sage (Oliver).  These large 
wineries seem to have a stronger level of social capital, though it is generally 
concentrated with local large wineries as seen in the following maps. 
 
























 Being a smaller winery in Naramata or Oliver does seem to lead to greater ties 















Figure Social Networks of Recent Small Oliver Winery (20OSR) 
 
Why Sub-appelations are insufficient 
 What can be done to improve social capital in the OKV?  Throughout field 
research, sub-appellations were a major source of hope, particularly for estate wineries, 
falling into certain areas.  In fact, there are several networks beginning to develop in each 
micro-cluster despite these obstacles.  The South Okanagan Winery Association meets 
monthly.  The Bottleneck Drive group in Summerland began meeting in 2009 and 
developed common signage to guide tourists in their area.  The Golden Mile area like 
Naramata is seeking new regulations to create its own sub-appellation.  Several have also 
discussed joint marketing efforts. 
 Ontario decided in 2005 to create and regulate sub-appellations that can appear on 
VQA labels, and this is the catalyst for a number of these regional associations to begin to 










distinguishing the locality of origin and the terroir it represents, however, they also 
related concerns by those on the margins about who would be included.  They are 
pushing the BCWA to create regulations that allow sub-appellation, to avoid a parallel of 
the cellared in Canada controversy.  This could help them to differentiate their product 
and reflects supply saturation of the BC market.  But none of these associations have 
anywhere near the critical mass to develop the collective institutions and policy needed to 
address the vulnerabilities of the industry.  Moreover, one can be skeptical that such 
efforts will pan out into significant market differences given successful sub-appellations 
elsewhere based on regions, such as Burgundy, Champagne, Willamette Valley, etc. 
which are associated with specialization in a certain varietal.   
The Problem with OKV Institutions 
The weakness and fragmentation of BC wine institutions underscores the lack of 
social capital in the OKV.  We asked respondents to rate the importance of support 
institutions using a 5 point scale (1 = not important; 2= slightly; 3 = neutral; 4= 
somewhat; and 5= extremely) with the following average scores: 
Table Low Rating of Institutional Support 
Ministry of Agric, Food, & Fisheries 1.9 
PARC 2.8 
Okanagan University-UBC 1.9 
UBC Wine Research Centre 1.8 
BC Wine Grape Council 2.2 
BC Grapegrowers Association 2.9 
BC Wine Institute 3.5 
BC Wine Authority 2.2 
Association of BC winegrowers 2.2 
Okanagan Wine Festival Society 3.4 




The table points to the Wine Festival Society and the Wine Institute as the only 
ones that are of neutral importance.  The problem of fragmentation and lack of 
institutional support is even deeper.  Kingsbury relates in a detailed analysis the slow 
unraveling of the BCWI as the key to understanding the fragmentation of the emerging 
cluster.  He highlights foremost problems with the governance of the institution.  The 
government appointed the 8 members of the 8 person Board of Directors, however, it 
took input from various sectors.  The BCEWA gave 2 candidates and the MAFF 
representative had one slot.  Financing came primarily from the provincial and federal 
governments (885); the rest was from a levy on membership by ton produced and wines 
bottled, with an additional $.05 a litre levy being added in 1993 for VQA marketing.  In 
1993, the BCWI started a number of new committees to make recommendations to the 
Board, which by 1995 included: Domestic Marketing, Export, Finance, Policy, Technical, 
and Strategic Plan.  The committees were filled by volunteers from the wineries 
(Kingsbury 2004, 41-7).  There was concern within BCWI that the BC market could 
become saturated, and that international recognition of quality was needed in turn for full 
acceptance within Canada of the quality of BC wines.  Therefore, in 1993 the BCWI 
began a long-term export program.  It began with a strong effort in the UK to promote 
BC wines.   In 1995, the BCWI partnered with the Ontario VQA to create a Canada VQA 
appellation.  However, the program fell apart, as only a few firms had the capacity to 
export in volumes large enough for international markets (Kingsbury 2004, 63-5).  The 
fallout from the decline of the BCWI likely led to the development of the BC Wine 
Authority taking over important parts of its turf. 
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These new BCWI programs occurred at the same time as government funding was 
diminishing, leading to an increase in levies to $90/ton and in the costs of taste tests for 
VQA from $25 to $50.  The changing in funding also led to cutbacks in promotional 
programs and growing concerns about financial management issues.  While medium-
sized firms paid the most in levies, the aggregate amount from small wineries was 
increasing as their numbers increased over time.  The shift in constituency as well as the 
abovementioned issues led to a loss of faith in the BCWI by the smaller wineries, who 
began to withhold their levies.  The smaller wineries felt disenfranchised from the Board 
and the committees.  The situation worsened when the first elections for the Board took 
place in 1999, which included a proviso that any Board decisions could be re-voted on a 
second time based on votes weighted by dues paid (Kingsbury 2004, 70-85).  The 
unraveling of the organization led to a reduction of the overall levy as well as a flexible 
levy system.  Each winery‟s levy was reduced to $5/ton, with additional fees for 
marketing promotion domestically and for exporting.  The shortfall in resources led to the 









In response to an earlier version of this report, Miles Prodan, 
Executive Director of BCWI offers, “the BC Wine Institute‟s (BCWI) 
volunteer membership represents 95% of BC VQA sales AND 88% of 
the TOTAL wine production in the province. Wholly supported through 
member sales, the BCWI represents the interests of BC VQA wine 
producers in the marketing, communication and advocacy of their 
products to all stakeholders. Whether in partnership with the BCLDB, its 
21 BC VQA wine stores, the export market via the Canadian Vintners 
Association (CVA) or tourism and media stakeholders, the BCWI strives 
to provide leadership for the BC wine industry.” 
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The new BC Wine Authority (BCWA) seeks to address some of the problems 
with BCWI by offering a more neutral body to taste for VQA.  The BCWI suffered from 
the perceived conflict of interest that it only represented some of the larger wineries and 
that it also had to market and promote the same wines.
16
  Under the new statutes, all 
wineries seeking VQA labeling must be members of the authority.  It is difficult to say 
what role the new BCWA will play at this point, though initial indications are that it will 
be limited to tasting, and several interviewees suggested it was reluctant to sort out the 
basic labeling issues described above.  Multiple interview requests by the author to the 
BCWA received no response. 
Vulnerability # 8- Poor Coordination of Supply Chains 
Power in the value chain has changed over time as the OKV industry has 
transformed.  As noted, previous to NAFTA, a grape reference price existed, set by the 
BC Grape Marketing Board.  Though the grape marketing board continues to exist, after 
the reference price was eliminated in 1995 it has had little influence on supply, since 
grape prices are freely negotiated between wineries and grape growers (Hickton 2005, 
11).  An interviewee suggests the board ended in 1997 based on a referendum.  As of 
1998, there were 235 grape growers in the OKV, of which 119 were supplying wineries.  
The average vineyard size was 12-14 acres (Hackett 1998, 61).  In 2001, Quail‟s Gate 
started a trend by changing the nature of its contracts to grape growers, so that it paid set 
amounts for grapes of high quality, rather than by the ton (Schreiner 2003, 98).  There are 
long-standing trends that reflect the desire of grape growers to enter into the winery 
business, such as Desert Hills.  This seems to be a growing trend.  Scherzinger Vineyards 
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started as a grapegrower to Sumac Ridge and then split off in 1995 (Schreiner 2003, 105).  
However, interviews with the winemakers in the OKV reveal a haphazard patchwork of 
ever changing contracts, that lack the long-term stability or consistency to lead to quality 
improvement.  The possibility that estate wineries could be expanded (with wineries 
simply growing more of their own grapes) was rejected as implausible by interviewees 
owing to the prohibitively high price of land.  This leads to the inability to focus on 
certain varietals as a strategy, as almost all decent size wineries have to outsource their 
grape supply, which come from a variety of terroirs and mesoclimates around the Valley.   
Rising costs and a shortage of labour have led to increasing use of temporary migrant 
workers, many from Mexico, and accompanying concerns about labour practices in the 
industry.  Workers are not unionized, but activist efforts have led to some notice about 
their conditions. 
It is also fueling the expansion in the number of wineries as grape growers feel 
that they are not getting a fair share of the final profits, and so decide to move into 
winemaking themselves.  All of this will change, if either the demand or supply of grapes 
changes, as is inevitable at some point, bringing up the question of whether the anarchic 
structure of winery-grower relations can adapt.  Most importantly, the uncertainty 
around these arrangements means that it is difficult to improve quality among the grape 
growers, as investments by the wineries could lead to defection (sales to other wineries) 
and the feeling among grape growers that such investments are not worthwhile when 
demand for their product is so high.  One interviewee suggested that a return to a 
marketing board or other form of collective agreement did not have adequate support 
given growers‟ favourable situation, but that it could change if the expected supply 
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surplus of grapes arises.  He and several other interviewees noted the increasing pressure 
on land as marginal areas were being brought into play in response to demand, with 
accompanying difficulties in improving quality.   
The OKV also lacks local equipment suppliers.  Most equipment, corks, bottles, 
labels, chemicals, and other inputs are imported (Hickton and Padmore 2005, 97 & 107).  
In Oliver, Okanagan Barrel Works operates as the only cooper in the region, using wood 
imported from elsewhere.  Interviewees note a bias against local products; for example 
many said that many local wineries insist that the wood used must be imported from 
France.  Many interviewees cited local suppliers when they really meant local agents for 
imported equipment.  Local suppliers face problems similar to the wine industry as a 
whole- with inadequate demand, they are unable to reach economies of scale, and so find 
it difficult to compete with the behemoths of the industry, especially with Canadian 
skilled wages being relatively high.  Their comparative advantage is that they are able to 
tailor products and services to particular needs, and to provide local service.   Suppliers 
interviewed suggested that their quality was improving in line with the demands of the 
wineries.  Suppliers interviewed universally suggested entrance from a non-winemaking 
background and almost all noted that they were self-trained. 
Vulnerability #9: Training Opportunities and Lack of Research 
Dissemination for Innovation 
Training opportunities for BC wine personnel are quite limited.  A surprising 
number of wine personnel, including winemakers, come from another background and 
have had limited formal training.  There is assuredly a refreshing quality about this, with 
abounding blue sky enthusiasm coming through in interviews.  One supplier interviewed 
(himself not formally trained) suggested that he had observed that ability to take risks and 
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to learn on the job were more important than formal training, and that he had seen a 
number of “Ph.D. types” fail for lack of such attributes.  Nonetheless, he and other wine 
suppliers as well as the winemakers themselves universally noted that the industry‟s push 
to increase sophistication was hitting major obstacles given the lack of educational and 
outreach support.  
Given the lack of formal training opportunities, the provincial Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) in the late 1990s operated a business 
planning program, that examined both grape production and taught basics on viticulture 
investment and financial planning (Hackett 1998, 125).  However, the one employee 
dedicated to grape growing retired and was never replaced.  A number of interviewees 
pointed out that the lack of expertise and “grounding” in the industry generally is what 
left them skeptical that the government could play any helpful pro-active role. 
In terms of support institutions, there is little coordination between PARC and 
UBC‟s Wine Research Centre.  In my opinion and that of many interviewees, and 
certainly in comparison with other wine research centres, PARC is spread far too thin, 
covering a wide variety of crops from tree fruits to wine grapes with just a handful of 
experts.  However, PARC disagrees with this conclusion.  There are reports of challenges 
regarding reaching intellectual property agreements as well.  UBC sees its role as 
international in scope, and focused on the discovery of scientific processes and products 
that would be valuable to the worldwide market, as seems appropriate for the nature of its 
genomics-based research.  The idea of having a middleman from the BC wine industry 
has occurred to them, however Director Hennie J.J. Van Vuuren states that while it would 
be good to have an ex-winemaker play this (bridging) role, “it is important to me to have 
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personal relationships with the winemakers themselves.”  Thus the interactions of the 
research centre seem to be focused on a handful of leading large wineries in the OKV.  
One can see this as a situation where these leading wineries would become first adopters 
and then other wineries would imitate their lead, however, the nature and speed of that 
dissemination given the lack of collective institutions or middlemen is bound to be slow 
and haphazard at best. 
 Reinforcing this observation is that fact that there is no university-level training 
institute as in the US, Europe, or Australia, or even the BA equivalent offered by Brock 
University in Ontario.  The UBC Okanagan campus offers 3 programs for training: 
viticulture, winery assistant, and wine sales, at the BA level, that have operated since 
1997.  Each program has a common course on grapes and grape growing, and then 3 
specialized courses for the particular program, as well as a practicum course to allow for 
hands on learning.  As several interviewees noted, this is hardly sufficient for those above 
the retail level.  It is worth noting that 2 courses on Enology are being offered in UBC 
Okanagan in 2011 in biochemistry, with enrollments of 50 and 17.  Previously, Wine 
Chemistry courses had been offered every 2 years by a Chemistry professor every 2 
years, with unknown enrollment.  Okanagan College has offered 3 certificate programs: 
viticulture, wine sales, and winery assistant, from 1999-present.  Enrollments have varied 
between 12 (1999) and 44 (2008-9), with 30 total students in 2009-10. 
Because of distance from UBC Okanagan, most wineries in the Penticton area and 
south rely upon Okanagan College (OC) for basic training.  One winemaker thinks the 
OC‟s offerings are sufficient, and certainly better than UBC-Okanagan, stating, “I think 
you will find that over the last 15 years or so these (OC wine courses) have been very 
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well attended. Compare this to the 2 or 3 graduates being turned out each year from UBC 
(if that).”  Several winemakers expressed the desirability of moving the UBC Wine 
Research Centre to the Okanagan.  Some of the smaller wineries suggested that formal 
training was either unnecessary or that it was inaccessible.  One suggested more distance 
education offerings.  One medium-sized winemaker suggested that the UBC Wine 
Research Centre could provide a great service by creating summaries and links to full 
papers with the latest research, but with very few exceptions, there was almost no stock 
put into local research by industry participants.  The lack of recognition of the potential 
value of research was revealed early on in the project, with the lack of response, or even 
hostility, to responding to survey and interview requests, including by the support 
institutions.  To complete the project required 6 months of active personal entreaties and 
networking through multiple channels. 
As with the other issues, the needs of the industry are filled only through a 
patchwork of make do solutions.  Almost all respondents said that suppliers (such as 
Cellar Tek) and independent consultants were the most important sources of innovation, 
and self-teaching seems to be the predominant modus vivendi.  A few interviewees said 
that there was nothing new in winemaking, so no need for innovation knowledge.  While 
some of the larger wineries have their marketing personnel who research market trends, 
most wineries make do or guess.  One interviewee stated that he/she just follows the 
general lead.  Most interviewees at the medium- and larger-sized wineries indicated that 
the lack of training opportunities was clearly an impediment in comparison with other 
wine growing regions.   
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The research by the UBC Wine Research Centre was praised highly by a few of 
the larger wineries in the OKV, but most of the interviewees did not seem to have any 
knowledge of it or what it did.  The UBC Okanagan campus‟s activities seem to have an 
even lower profile.  Several interviewees suggested that the Wine Research Centre 
relocate to Kelowna, but the real problem seems to be a lack of a middleman to translate 
what the cutting edge research in grape growing and winemaking is to the average 
winery.  The following table summarizes the findings about the modalities of education 
and training. 
Table Few Training Opportunities 
18. HOW TRAINING IS PROVIDED 
In-house training 87.88% 
External provision of training 42.42% 
via UBC Okanagan 6.06% 
Consultants 42.42% 
via Okanagan College 12.12% 
Other, please specify 6.06% 
 
Clearly, there is a major institutional gap in terms of training opportunities in the 
Okanagan Valley.  Of our sample, an average of just 30% of employees at these wineries 
have any formal training, and this is probably an overstatement as we included those who 
might have just completed a course.  While the employees of wealthier wineries are 
sending their children abroad, this does not provide the rich environment needed for 
employees at lower levels or for the creation of an atmosphere of local learning and 
exchange.  Particularly in the case of agriculture, training and research should be oriented 
towards and tailored for, the local environment. 
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These findings underscore what we found out about institutions.  While 55% said 
that their production processes had improved “a lot” over the past 2 years, almost no 
respondents identified any institutions as being above a score of 1 in terms of help with 
innovation.  The industry relies heavily on easy access sources for ideas for innovation as 
illustrated in average scores in the following table (1-5 scale). 
Table Few Sources of Local Innovation or Dissemination 
Internal Company Sources  4.5 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components or software 
3.7 
Clients or customers 2.9 
Joint research with Other BC Wineries – 
Marketing 
2.3 
Wineries outside of BC 2.3 
Consultants 3.4 
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions 3.5 
Trade magazines or journals 3.7 
Internet 3.8 
 
In terms of possible areas where innovation had occurred, we found the following 
results. 
Table Innovation of Interest Despite Lack of Support 
Retail sales 51.52% 
Marketing 66.67% 
Finance 30.30% 
Plant Breeding 9.09% 
Use of Genetics 3.03% 
Soil Adaptation  54.55% 
Fermentation 63.64% 
Information Systems 45.45% 
Education/Training 60.61% 
 
Clearly, there is great interest in soil adaptation and fermentation processes, as 
well as further training.  This demonstrates a clear gap between the support institutions 
65 
 
and the winemakers that should be filled by support institutions.  The limited nature of 
innovation dissemination reflects that a number of interviewees mention the lack of any 
agricultural extension agency for the industry.  In 1994, a major breakthrough for BC 
wineries took place, as Mission Hill won a top trophy at a London wine competition for 
its Chardonnay.  The winery had hired John Simes, a top winemaker at a New Zealand 
winery, in 1992 (Schreiner 2003, 96), and thus started a trend of hiring Australians or 
New Zealanders, and to a lesser extent Canadians trained there, that appears to be 
accelerating today.  There was also universal chagrin at the lack of agricultural extension 
support.  While PARC was mentioned positively by some medium-sized wineries, most 
of the smaller and larger wineries stated that it was unimportant to them.  One 
interviewee, reflecting the sentiments of many others, said that PARC was “helpful in 
terms of viticulture, and AgCanada (Agriculture Canada) in terms of pesticides and some 
related areas of agriculture, but really offered nothing in terms of winemaking advice, or 
practical knowledge.”  Repeated follow-up enquiries to PARC, including requests for 
access to their own research by the author received no response.  Finally a response on 
June 29, 2011, was received in which PARC stated in a letter to the author that 
agricultural extension was not part of its mandate, but that of the province, that it works 
very closely with industry, including professional relationships with individual growers 
and winemakers, and disseminates its research widely.  This still bring up the issue, if 
PARC does not do extension, and the province does not, who fills this crucial role in BC?  
At present, the answer is no one, a crucial gap and detriment to the industry‟s fortunes.  
PARC and BCWI‟s responses reflect the defensiveness pervasive throughout the BC 
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industry and the ubiquitous inability of almost anyone to see the bigger picture industry 
issues reflected throughout this report. 
Conclusions 
 The BC Wine industry centred in the Okanagan, has undergone an amazing 
transformation from “plonk” wine manufacturer to a viable industry, with some 
beginning to meet world class standards of quality.  However, the industry is more of a 
proto-cluster, with key issues stemming from a lack of organization, coordination, and 
policy foresight.  Policy changes are constrained by the use of liquor sales and 
accompanying protectionism as a cash cow through the provincial monopoly, which has 
created the conditions for the growth of the sector.  The BC case is not a good fit for 
lessons about how to engender clusters generally, given these idiosyncrasies.  However, it 
does support many of the key concepts behind cluster theory: that geography matters 
crucially in some industries and explains their locational concentration; that a pro-active 
policy can help to catalyze an industry; and that social networks and collective action are 
essential to clusters‟ long-term success.  
While lauding the present success, we are likely entering into a new phase for the 
maturing of the sector, one in which growing pains will start to become evident unless 
there are major adjustments.  Adjustments can not occur in the absence of a long-run 
view of the industry as a whole, or the growth of the policy and collective networks of the 
industry.  Interviewees from the public sector, and all areas of the private sector 
universally decried the lack of cooperation and organization of the sector.  Without major 
efforts to create a cluster policy, the vulnerabilities noted above could lead to major 
problems in the industry.  As one interviewee put it rather nicely, “We don‟t need 
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consensus (a la the BCWI early experiment) to move forward.  But we do need a push 
towards a culture of cooperation, and organizations to improve our collective efforts and 
policy.”17   
The bottom line is that no one in BC has a strategic long-term vision for the 
industry.  In general, the policy literature tells us that major policy change does not occur 
unless there is a crisis.  This policy paper hopes to catalyse forces that might prove 
otherwise and suggests places to start before that unhappy circumstance arises. 
                                                 
17
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encouragement.  Patty Hira helped with crucial research and editing in the final round.  
The Scientific Advisory Board of this project provided helpful feedback.  David 
Aylward, Peter Phillips and Camille Ryan provided crucial advice, particularly on survey 
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APPENDIX Survey Document 
BC Wine Survey    By Hira and Aylward                     
updated: May 31, 2010                          
                            
NB: Read ethics disclaimer and get signature.                        
                            
                            
I. Basic Firm and Industry-Level Information                        
                            
                            
1. Firm Identification as of May 2010                              
A. Name                    
B. Address                       
C. Acreage                        
D. Region                       
E. Year Founded                       
F. Number of Employees                    
G.. Tonnes crushed or Litres/cases sold                   
H.. When did you start selling wine?      Date:                      
                            
                            
2. Revenues                           
a. Have your revenues increased /decreased in the past 12 months?                  
b. By what percentage?                       
c.Has the volume of wine sold increased/decreased?”, by what %                  
d. What price points are you currently targeting?                    
e. Have these increased/decreased over the past 12 months?                     
                           
3. Is your company part of a larger enterprise group?                                
Yes                         
No                             
                            
4. Is your company Canadian or Foreign Owned? Family Owned?  (Y/N)                       
Canadian                           
Foreign                            
Family Owned?                          
                            
5. What percentage of the grapes that your company uses is purchased                     
 from growers off your estate?  exact number or estimate %                             
                       
                            
6.  If you purchase, what % of your grapes are BC, Canada, or International                     
BC/Local                            
RoCanada                             
International                            
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7. What percentage of your wine is sold within? (last 3 years)                        
BC?                            
Canada?                            
                             
Exported?                           
What percentage of your wine is currently surplus to demand?                      
                            
8. How would you rate your firm’s reliance on the following for competitive 
advantage                     
(1-5) scale with 1 = not important, 2 slightly important, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat 
important  and 5 being                   
extremely important                       
Access to latest winemaking and viticultural information                   
Market placement at appropriate price-points (price competitiveness)                  
Marketing                       
Branding                        
New product development                     
Product differentiation                      
Employee training                       
Production process continual improvement                    
Distribution channels                      
Agents                        
Exporting                        
                            
                            
II. Networking                            
                             
9. Give the relative importance and frequency of interactions with the following                     
(1-5) scale with 1 = not important, 2 slightly important, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat 
important  and 5                   
being extremely important (Annually, Monthly; Weekly;Daily; and 
Formal/Informal or Both)                    
Did they help you with innovation?  
   Importance       Frequency       Formal/  Innovation 
   (1-5)         (A,Q,M,W,D)   Informal/    Help? 
     Both           (Y/N)               
Ministry of Agric, Food, & Fisheries                           
                            
PARC         
                      
                            
Okanagan University-UBC                                    
                            
UBC Wine Research Centre                                
                            
BC Wine Grape Council                          
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BC Grapegrowers Association                            
                            
BC Wine Institute                             
                            
BC Wine Authority                           
                            
Association of BC Winegrowers                         
                            
Okanagan Wine Festivals Society                          
                            
Okanagan College                         
                            
Other  (specify)      
                      
                            
                            
10. Give the relative importance and frequency of interactions with the following 
other wineries                    
in the Okanagan Valley (or other region studied); **They can see list of wineries on 
survey PO                  
(1-5) scale with 1 = not important, 2 slightly important, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat 
important  and 5 being                   
extremely important   
 
    Importance (1-5) Frequency    Formal/Informal/ 
       (A,Q,M,W,D)    Both 
8th Generation Vineyard 
Antelope Ridge 
 Arrowleaf Cellars 
 Beaumont 
 Black Hills Estate Winery 
Black Widow 
 Blasted Church Vineyards 
Blue Mountain Vineyard and Cellars 
Burrowing Owl Estate Winery 
Calona, Sandhill, Peller Vineyards 
Camelot 
  CedarCreek Estate Winery 
Chandra Estate Winery 
Crowsnest Vineyards 
D'Angelo Estate Winery 
Deep Creek/Hainle Vineyards Estate 
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Desert Hills Estate Winery 
Dirty Laundry Vineyard 
Dunham & Froese Estate Winery 
Elephant Island Orchard 
ExNihlo 
  Fairview 
  Forbidden Fruit Winery 
 
  Gehringer Bros 
 Golden Beaver 
 Granite Creek 
 Gray Monk Estate Winery 
Greata Ranch Vineyards 
Hawthorne Mountain Vineyards 
Herder Winery & Vineyards 
Hester Creek Estate Winery 
Hijas Bonitas 
 Hillside Estate Winery 
Hollywood & Wine 
 Howling Bluff 
 House of Rose Vineyards 
Inniskillin Okanagan Vineyards 
Jackson-Triggs 
 K Mountain 
 Kalala Organic 
 Kettle Valley Winery 
La Frenz Winery 
 Lake Breeze Vineyards 
Lang Vineyards 
 Larch Hills 
 Laughing Stock Vineyards 
Le Vieux Pin (oliver)/La Stella (osoyoos) 
Little Straw Vineyards 
 
  Mission Hill Family Estate Winery 
Mistral Estate Winery 
Mt. Boucherie Estate Winery 





Noble Ridge Vineyard & Winery 
Oliver Twist 
 Orofino Vineyards 
 Pentage Winery 
 Poplar Grove Winery 
Quails' Gate Estate Winery 
Quinta Ferreira 
 Raven Ridge 
 Recline Ridge 
 Red Rooster Winery 
Road 13 (Golden Mile) Cellars 
Robin Ridge 
 Rollingdale Winery 
 Ruby Tuesday 
 Rustic Roots 
 
 
  See Ya Later @HMV 
Seven Stones 
 Silk Scarf 
  Silver Sage Winery 
 Soaring Eagle 
 Sonoran Estate Winery 
Spiller Estates 
 Stag's Hollow Winery 
St. Hubertus 
 St. Lazlo 
  Stoneboat Vineyards 
Stonehill Estate Winery 
Stone Mountain 
 Sumac Ridge Estate Winery 
Summerhill Pyramid Winery 
Tangled Vines 
 Tantalus Vineyards 
 Therapy Vineyards 
 Thornhaven Estates 
 Tinhorn Creek Vineyards 
Township 7 Vineyards & Winery 
Twisted Tree 




 Wild Goose Vineyards 
Zero Balance 
 Other (specify) 
  
 
                  
11. How would you rate the importance of geographical proximity to other firms & 
industry bodies?                   
Critical                             
Important                             
Marginally important                           
No impact                            
A disadvantage                             
                            
III. Innovation                           
                            
12. Innovative Activities                          
a. How many new products (brands or lines) have you developed over the past 2 yrs?                       
b. Have you seen significant product improvement over that period? Y/N                         
c.To what extent have you improved production processes over this time not much, a 
little, or a lot                       
                            
                            
13. Are there any particular companies you see as leaders in innovation? List 
companies                         
                            
                            
14. In which areas has innovation occured over the past three years in your 
company? (select all that apply) *PO list for them                 
Retail Sales                            
Marketing                            
Finance                             
Plant Breeding                            
Use of Genetics                            
Soil Adaptation                             
Fermentation                            
Information Systems                            
Education/Training                            
Other, please specify                           
                            
                            
15. How important were the following actors to innovation activities your company 
was involved                   
 in over the past three years?    (select all that apply)                    
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(1-5) scale with 1 = not important, 2 slightly important, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat 
important  and 5 being extremely important  
                      Level  
                                                                                                  Level of Importance (1-5) 
      
Internal Company Sources                            
                            
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software                        
                            
Clients or customers                            
                            
Joint research with Other BC Wineries                          
                            
Wineries outside of BC                           
                            
Consultants                            
                            
Conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions                          
                            
Trade magazines or journals                           
                            
Internet                             
                            
Other (list)                            
                            
                            
16. How important were the following sources of funding for these innovations? 1-5 
scale                   
(1-5) scale with 1 = not important, 2 slightly important, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat 
important  and 5 being extremely important                  
Personal Finances                            
                            
Commercial Bank/credit union                           
                            
Venture Capitalists                            
                            
Federal Government                           
                            
Provincial Government                           
                            
Local or Regional Government                           
                            
17. If your company has not been involved in utilizing major innovation, why is this 
the case?                    
       
 (check all that apply)                  
Not needed by the company                           
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Too expensive                            
Lack of human resources                            
Lack of information on technology                          
Lack of information on potential markets                           
Difficulty in finding co-operative partners                          
Lack of adequate or clear regulatory framework                         
Unaware of what‟s available                           
                            
                            
18. How is training given in your company? Y/N for each                       
In-house training                            
External provision of training                           
via UBC Okanagan                            
Consultants                            
via Okanagan College                           
Other, please specify                           
                            
                            
19. Number of trained employees as % of total employees?  
                      
                            
                            
20. How important is wine tourism for your strategy?  1-5   
                      
(1-5) scale with 1 = not important, 2 slightly important, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat 
important  and 5 being extremely important                  
                            
C.  Strategy (personal interviews)                         
i.-How do you target markets for your wine?  How do you identify the appropriate price 
points and types of product that will sell?                
ii.-What are the tradeoffs between being a small independent producer and part of a 
larger global enterprise?                  
iii.. Do you believe exporting (if applicable) has made your firm more competitive?  In 
which ways?                   
iv- How do you see the role of government in terms of the industry?  How do you see 
industry associations?                  
What else could governments or industry associations do to enhance the industry's 
competitiveness?                   
v. To what extent are you able to rely upon local suppliers for equipment?  Has this 
changed over time.                   
vi. Do you take a scientific or artisan approach or both?  Do you see wine more as a 
commodity or cultural asset?  How important is terroir to the value of your product?  
How important is the local identification ot the sale of your product?       
vii.- What role does the success of the wine cluster have in terms of the overall identity 
and culture of this province and of the country? Do your suppliers tend to be local or 
global?            
 Do your buyers tend to be local or global?                        
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viii. Do you primarily take an artisan or scientific approach to winemaking?                     
Reasons?                            
What role do you think the concept of terroir plays in the value and perceived value of 
your product?                   
What value do your buyers place on local identity?                        
Do you view your wine as a commodity or more of a cultural asset?                      
                            
 
